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Daniel D. Hutto, Shaun Gallagher, Jesús Ilundáin-Agurruza and Inês Hipólito 
 
 
“we must … confront the ever-active predictive brain in its 
proper setting – inextricably intertwined with an empowering 
backdrop of material, linguistic and sociocultural scaffolding” 
 
- Clark 2016, p. 270 
 
 
Culture colours cognition, even the most basic forms of perception. Quite literally, it 
seems. The Greek language has two words for ‘blue’ (light blue [ghalazio] and dark 
blue [ble]), but only one for ‘green’. Thierry et al. (2009), using EEG, measured a 
specific neuronal signal, visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) over the visual cortex, 
in Greek and English speakers. This signal occurs c.200 milliseconds following the 
presentation of an oddball stimulus – for example, a square in a series of circles, or a 
dark blue circle in a series of light blue circles. The signal features in a pre-attentive, 
unconscious and very early stage of visual processing. For blue contrasts, vMMN 
showed significant difference in Greek speakers, but no significant difference for 
English speakers. That is, the way Greek and English have been enculturated appears 
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to make a difference to the ways the brains of speakers of these respective languages 
respond in early visual processing to different shades of blue. 
 Making sense of such evidence through the lens of radical enactivism, human 
cognition is not only shaped but utterly permeated by the patterned practices in which 
it partakes and the socio-cultural contexts within which those practices grow and 
develop. Socio-cultural influences not only operate with respect to our explicitly 
formed and expressed beliefs and values, they can inform and infuse what we see and 
feel in quite basic ways – as in the cited case of such influences on the early stages of 
color perceiving for Greek and English speakers. In such cases the response patterns 
of the plastic brains of the two sets of speakers have been differently shaped, where 
such shaping occurs over a protracted developmental timescale. 
For enactivists, brains play an important role in the ongoing dynamical attunement 
of organism to environment. In social interaction, for example, brain processes 
integrate into a complex mix of transactions that involve moving, gesturing, and 
engaging with the expressive bodies of others. These are bodies that, situated in 
various environments, incorporate artifacts, tools, and technologies, adopt diverse 
social roles and engage in various institutional practices. Thus, not only the body, but 
also physical, social, and cultural environments are important factors both 
evolutionarily and developmentally for any understanding of neural plasticity.  
Brains do not evolve in vitro or in a vat. They evolve to function the way they do 
because they evolve with the body they are part of, and in environments that are 
coupled in specific ways to those bodies. Brains participate in a system in which 
neural activity is not the isolated seat of cognition but shapes and is shaped by all 
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these other factors. Cognition, even of the most basic sort, involves transactions 
within the complete system – thus within the system’s neural and extra-neural 
elements. 
Enactivists emphasize not only sensory-motor contingencies but also embodied 
affects, as well as the role that intersubjective interaction plays in shaping cognition 
(Gallagher 2017; Gallagher and Bower 2014). Cognition is situated organismic 
activity that takes the form of complex, dynamical processes at multiple levels and on 
different timescales, where these processes are part of a dynamical engagement or 
response of the whole organism, living in and materially engaging with structured 
environments.  
The way environments structure minds and the way minds structure environments 
involves a metaplasticity that goes both ways – brain activity is part of what enables 
changes to the physical, social, and cultural environments that change brains and vice 
versa (Malafouris 2013). Interventions at any point in this self-organizing system of 
brain-body-environment will incur (sometimes friendly, sometimes not so friendly) 
adjustments to the whole. 
A signature feature of classical cognitivist attempts to explain behaviour is to 
endorse a methodologically individualistic intellectualism that favours “‘process’ over 
‘context’” (Ceci and Roazzi 1994, p. 74). Accordingly, and in tune with an aspiration 
to discover universal psychological laws that operate anywhere and everywhere, 
classical cognitivist approaches have sought to identify narrow, internal properties of 
individuals – indeed, usually only properties or processes of their brains – that could 
causally explain how behaviour is produced. Such internal factors are portrayed as 
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independent of whatever may be happening in the cognizer’s environment. 
Situationally specific factors are unwelcome in this class of explanations; such 
explanations “short shrift context” (Ceci and Roazzi 1994, p. 74). 
Fundamentally for classical cognitivists – as Ceci and Roazzi (1994) astutely 
highlight – the processes that are assumed to constitute cognition – whether these are 
understood as, say, information processing or neurocomputational activity – are of 
special explanatory interest. All else, the influences of culture and context included, is 
treated as a “form of noise” (p. 74). Accordingly, “context is viewed as an adjunct to 
cognition, rather than a constituent of it” (Ceci and Roazzi 1994, p. 75). 
Going against the standard conceptions of cognition, these authors (along with 
many others in the E-cognition movement) called for an approach to cognition that 
could “integrate the environmental dimensions into a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework of organism-environment interaction” (Ceci and Roazzi 1994, p. 76). They 
sought a framework that would enable us to understand the “intersection in 
development of an individual’s biological background and the sociocultural 
environment in which the individual grows up” (Ceci and Roazzi 1994, p. 76). 
In what follows, we advance a radically enactive account of cognition, just the sort 
of framework that Ceci and Roazzi (1994) were looking for. We provide arguments in 
favour of the possibility that cultural factors permeate rather than penetrate cognition, 
such that cognition extensively and transactionally incorporates cultural factors rather 
than there being any question of cultural factors having to break into the restricted 
confines of cognition.  
Section 1 reviews the limitations of two classical cognitivist, modularist accounts 
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of cognition and ultimately gives reasons for going beyond the cognitive penetrability 
debate. There are empirical reasons to adopt a revisionary, new order variant of 
cognitivism – a Predictive Processing account of Cognition, or PPC. Yet, to do so 
reveals that although it appears the contentful adjustment of predictive hypotheses is 
possible, the question of cognitive penetrability no longer arises.  
Building on this conclusion, Section 2 then looks closely at Ramstead et al.’s 
(2016) attempt to explain how cultural factors might make a difference to cognition by 
appealing to our sensitivity to cultural affordances as explained under the auspices of 
PPC. While that proposal is prima facie promising, Section 3 reveals that, in 
committing to a cognitivist interpretation of PPC à la Clark (2016), it is conservatively 
and problematically attached to the idea of inner models and stored knowledge.  
Finally, Section 4 seeks to honour Ramstead et al’s (2016) motivating insights 
while avoiding troublesome theoretical commitments. To achieve this it offers a 
radically enactive alternative account of how cultural factors matter to cognition. 
Going the radically enactive way requires yet another theoretical twist – one that 
requires abandoning any vestige of the idea that cultural factors might contentfully 
communicate with basic forms of cognition. In place of that idea, the possibility that 
culture permeates cognition is promoted. 
Pulling all the threads together, we conclude that careful scrutiny of the available 
theoretical possibilities gives compelling reason to favour the possibility that culture 
permeates, rather than penetrates, cognition and a radically enactive approach to 
thinking about how it does so.  
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1. Cognitivist Options: Contentful Encapsulation, Binding or Adjusting? 
 
Questions about whether and how deeply cultural and contextual factors might 
penetrate cognition are only intelligible against the backdrop of particular assumptions 
about the nature of cognition. This is because how we conceive of cognition 
determines how we think it is possible that cultural and contextual factors could make 
a difference to it.  
For example, the cognitivist debate about whether early vision can be cognitively 
penetrated or not assumes that the content of early visual processes is at least open to 
cognitive penetration – which is to say that contentful attitudes of belief, desire, 
knowledge and the like might contentfully inform what we see at the early and 
elementary stages of visual processing. Conversely, early vison will be cognitively 
impenetrable just in case the contents of early vision remain untouched by any 
contentful attitudes the perceiver may have (Pylyshyn 1999; Raftopoulos 2001).  
Importantly, questions about whether some or other cognitive process might be 
cognitively penetrated turn on whether the process in question can be modified “in 
virtue of the [presumed] content of states of the cognitive system” (MacPherson 2012, 
p. 27). Highlighting the importance of this requirement, MacPherson (2012) 
emphasizes –focusing on case of early vision– that “there have to be some links 
between the content of the cognitive state and the content of the perceptual state that is 
affected of a nature such that the effect on the content of the perceptual experience is 
made intelligible” (p. 27). Early vision will only be cognitively penetrable if it can be 
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somehow informed in some integral way that is contentful and not merely causal.1 
Sensu stricto, cognitive penetrability is only possible if there can be influential 
links between two sources of content such that the links in question can be made 
intelligible. That cognitive penetration requires the existence of intelligible links 
between two sources or types of content is a fundamental assumption for all parties in 
the cognitive penetrability debate. This assumption operates in the background and 
goes without notice since anyone embroiled in this debate must subscribe to 
cognitivism and the assumption that the relevant forms of cognition are contentful. 
It is easy to see the importance of these framing assumptions by focusing on the 
fact that there are at least two senses in which a given process might be cognitively 
impenetrable: these two senses exhibit different modal force. The process of, say, 
digestion of carbohydrates is necessarily cognitively impenetrable if it turns out –as 
we might safely assume– that digestion lacks any contentful attitudes that could 
possibly be penetrated. By contrast, the processes of, for example, early vision are 
widely thought to be possibly cognitively impenetrable. On the assumption that early 
visual processes are content involving they will turn out to be cognitively 
impenetrable if it turns out, contingently, that their contents cannot be informed by 
other contentful attitudes of perceivers.   
Having clarified some of the background philosophical assumptions operating in 
the debate about cognitive penetrability, it is worth noting that there is a wealth of 
empirical evidence that points to the existence of top-down effects on early 
perception. Such findings put great pressure on the modular accounts that assume that 
contentful attitudes cannot communicate with or inform early perception – viz. that 
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such attitudes don’t have any influence at the bottom rungs of cognition.2 
Defenders of traditional modular accounts argue that early perceptual processing is 
informationally encapsulated from the rest of cognition. They assume that early vision 
involves the creation of nonconceptual contents and that computations in early visual 
processing over such contents are specialized for and solely concerned with 
transforming spatio-temporal patterns of light hitting the retina into contentful 
representations. Building on the pioneering work of Marr (1982), visual processing is 
often characterized in terms of computations over contents that lead to specific low-
level descriptions of a visual scene, in terms of edges, shadows, and such (Pylyshyn, 
1999). For cognitivists about early vision, cognitive impenetrability follows directly: 
the contents of early visual processing are encapsulated from cognitive states, such as 
intentions, beliefs, and motivations. This is held to be so on such accounts despite the 
fact that early vision involves the manipulation of other sorts of contentful 
representations.  
Yet there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that so-called top-down beliefs, 
desires, emotions, motivations, and intentions do contentfully influence what we see, 
modifying the presumed contents of low-level perceptual processing, such as 
brightness, shape, or texture.3  
This research puts the modular accounts that favor the view that early vision is 
contentfully encapsulated under considerable pressure. The philosophical community 
has presented strong arguments, based on the best experimental evidence, in favor of 
cognitive penetrability (Arstila 2017; Marchi, 2017; Newen and Vetter, 2017; Stokes 
2017; Briscoe 2015; MacPherson 2015; Siegel 2012; Lyons 2011). Summing up a 
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conclusion from a wealth of similar work, Carruthers (2015) reports that “increasingly 
it has been argued that perceptual processing is deeply interactive at many different 
levels simultaneously” (p. 501). 
One way to accommodate this putative fact within the framework of classical 
cognitivism without surrendering a modular theory of mind would be to propose, as 
Carruthers (2015) does, that the products of early perception are not encapsulated 
from concepts and other contentful attitudes.  
The hypothesis is that culturally acquired concepts might be added to basic 
perceptual processing through a speedy online binding process. The conjecture is that 
conceptual information is transmitted rapidly to areas responsible for early perception; 
that there is a phase synchrony in the neural activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, 
temporal cortex and visual cortex which, for Carruthers (2015), suggests “meaningful 
interactions” (p. 502). Culturally acquired concepts might, through this means, inform 
and become bound up with contents of what is perceived though processes that are 
fast and online.  
Any integration of the sort Carruthers’s proposes would have to be extremely fast. 
For example, Thierry et al. (2009) show, in the aforementioned studies concerning 
Greek and English speakers, that the first, earliest positive peak elicited by visual 
stimuli revealing differences between the speakers occur in parietooccipital regions of 
the scalp at 100-130msecs; 100msecs prior to any indication of visual mismatch 
negativity (vMMN). 
For Carruthers’s proposal to work, whatever the exact speed of processing must be, 
perceptual and conceptual contents must be integrated by the time what is perceived is 
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broadcast to consciousness. The key idea is that the nonconceptual contents of basic 
perception and any culturally acquired conceptual contents start out being quite 
separate, but they are bound together through neural processes operating on an 
elemental timescale. Perceiving is thus a mix of the contents served up by early 
perceptual processing plus an extra step of adding conceptual contents before the 
entire package reaches consciousness. The theory is that even if early perception is 
assumed to be modular, it produces nonconceptual contents that are contentfully 
integrated with conceptual contents in ways that make the final product – the whole 
package – unencapsulated. 
In the end, it is unclear exactly where Carruthers’s (2015) account leaves us with 
respect to the cognitive penetrability debate. If, on the one hand, the hypothesized 
binding processes somehow contentfully infuse nonconceptual with conceptual 
contents then it would seem that cognitive penetration occurs and the two components 
are contentfully integrated. If, on the other hand, the binding process only attaches a 
conceptual content to an untouched core of nonconceptual perceptual contents then, 
strictly speaking, the perceptual contents will remain contentfullly encapsulated.  
There is another possibility. There are strong empirical grounds for thinking that 
perceptual processes are neither linear nor sequentially staged in the way that either of 
the above modular theories suppose. Impressed by these findings many researchers 
have been attracted to predictive processing accounts of cognition, or PPC (Hohwy 
2013, Clark 2016, Frith, 2016). According to PPC, the brain constantly and pro-
actively forms models and hypotheses about what it will perceive in the sensory 
stream, and it corrects its predictions by adjusting to or acting on the incoming 
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sensory information in an ongoing attempt to minimize error.  
Conceiving of perception under the auspices of PPC raises deep questions about 
the appropriateness of the penetration metaphor that fuels the debates about cognitive 
penetrability. This is because, according to PPC, contentful attitudes –in the form of 
predictive hypotheses– are assumed to come into play prior to any processing of 
sensory information in early perception. Such hypotheses are already in 
communication with incoming information supplied by the so-called lower levels of 
perceptual processing. This kind of interchange is one in which hypotheses are 
contentfully adjusted: it continues, on an on, as the contents of the hypotheses are 
altered in a dynamic way over time via feedback connections that tune and toggle the 
precision weightings given to anticipated possibilities. Top-down predictions are 
compared with and modified by low-level incoming sensory information, as the brain 
is forever on the lookout for possible mismatches, i.e., error signals.  
According to PPC, error signals are communicated up the line in a feed-forward 
way to higher levels of processing thereby correcting and adjusting the predictive 
model. Through further recurrent loops, a better predictive model is generated and fed 
down again to the sensory input layer until a sufficiently low error signal is achieved. 
In PPC, then, top-down attitudes play a crucial role – even in early perception – since 
they contribute directly to the content of what is perceived via their predictions about 
what is likely to be seen.  
Unlike the two modular theories discussed above, PPC requires us to revise 
thinking about cognitive penetrability quite fundamentally. Adoption of a PPC 
framework renders all modular accounts outmoded, whether they think of the contents 
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of early perception as contentfully encapsulated or contentfully integrated.  
There is much that speaks in favor of PPC, but to pursue this line is to embrace a 
radically revisionary framework that turns a great deal of previous cognitivist thinking 
on its head. In particular, PPC relinquishes the traditional assumption found in 
modular theories of perception that the we build models of the world in a staged 
manner based on incoming information (Clark 2016. p. 29-37, p. 51). According to 
PPC, our prior assumptions and hypotheses about what we expect to perceive in 
certain circumstances already shape and inform even the most basic perceptual 
activity. As such, to adopt PPC pushes us to abandon asking whether perceiving might 
be cognitively penetrated or otherwise since on the PPC account that question no 
longer makes sense because perceiving is always already contentful and continually 
contentfully adjusted in ongoing processes.   
 
2. Cultural Affordances Meet Neurocomputational Models 
 
Suppose we take PPC seriously as a framework for understanding even the most basic 
forms of cognition. How, through its lens, ought we to understand the way cultural 
factors make a difference to what we perceive and think at a fundamental level? 
According to Clark (2016), PPC contends that cultural factors shape and inform our 
basic cognitive abilities, skills and tendencies through interactions occurring over 
protracted, multi-generational timescales.  
The transformative processes that make our brains receptive to cultural influences 
involve prolonged exposure to local, socioculturally specific, patterned practices 
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(Roepstroff et al. 2010, Hutto and Kirchhoff 2015): our basic cognitive capacities are 
ready to be shaped by socio-cultural factors because we repeatedly use them within 
socio-culturally designed environments. Our basic cognitive capacities are scaffolded 
by being repeatedly deployed in specific ways that conform to established routines, 
customs and institutions – and, in some cases, using our basic capacities in such 
contexts enables the emergence of new forms and varieties of cognition (see Hutto 
and Satne 2015, Hutto and Myin 2017).4 
With the advent of the practices involving external symbols, for example, came the 
possibility of reading, writing, structured discussion, and schooling in the 
sociocultural specific forms we are familiar with today. Arguably, that brought 
cognitive capacities into being for the first time – capacities of the sort required for 
being able to think about certain subject matters – such as mathematics (Overman 
2016). The big idea is that through continual exposure to and involvement in 
sociocultural patterned practices, “Prediction hungry brains …. acquire forms of 
knowledge that were generally out-of-reach” (Clark 2016, p. 277).5 
Clark (2016) maintains that our interaction with material and socio-cultural 
designer environments train, trigger, and repeatedly transforms our more biologically 
basic forms of cognition. Ramstead et al. (2016) seek to understand how this happens 
as a matter of our becoming attuned to special kinds of cultural affordance – where 
such attunement is understood as a matter of embodying a “shared sets of 
expectations, reflected in the ability to engage immersively in patterned cultural 
practices” (p. 7). For humans, as these authors recognize, the regularities to which we 
are sensitive are “densely mediated (and often constituted) by cultural symbols, 
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narratives, and metaphors” (Ramstead et al. 2016. p. 14). 
The main hypothesis of Ramstead et al. (2016) is that feedback loops mediating 
shared attention and shared intentionality are the primary platform upon which we 
acquire our special sensitivity to cultural affordances. This is all part and parcel of the 
individual’s history of interactions and the shaping of expectations that history entails.  
Despite entertaining the possibility that the whole story about how we are shaped 
by cultural affordances might be told in contentless, radically enactive terms, 
Ramstead et al. (2016) cannot imagine how this might be done without appeal to 
neural models and special kinds of stored knowledge. For example, they are 
convinced that in order to be sensitive to cultural affordances we “must have shared 
sets of expectations—we must know what others expect us to expect” (Ramstead et al. 
2016, p. 7, emphasis added). 
This insistence –this ‘musty’ thinking– leads them to embrace an intellectualized  
position; one that stands halfway ‘in-between’ enactivist and cognitivist accounts of 
cognition and tries to marry the two at the altar of PPC (Hutto and Myin 2017). Thus, 
these authors, following Clark (2016) endorse a conservative enactive account of 
cognition through which they hope to account for the special knowledge that they 
think is needed to fill the perceived explanatory gap. 
Specifically, Ramstead et al (2016) maintain that “predictive processing models 
offer a plausible implementation for the neural-computational realization of 
affordance-responsiveness in the nervous system” (p. 12, emphasis added). 
Elaborating on this proposal, they tell us that the brain uses generative models which 
function:  
 16 
 
to dynamically extract and encode information about the distal environment as sets 
of probability distributions. The information involved here can be natural or 
conventional in kind … The system uses this generative model to guide adaptive 
and intelligent behavior by ‘inverting’ that model through Bayesian forms of 
(computational, subpersonal) inference (Ramstead et al. 2016. p. 9). 
 
They are thereby committed to the existence of neurocomputational models – 
models that exist in cognitive systems– which those systems must call on to explain 
how they are able to produce and guide “skilled intelligent, context-sensitive, adaptive 
behavior” (Ramstead et al. 2016. p. 7). 
  
3. Doing Without Neural Models: A Radical Take on Cognition 
 
A long tradition has it that only some organisms –only those that are truly cognitive– 
learn and deploy models that guide their behavior. Accordingly, those creatures 
capable of “only model-free responses are, in [a backward-looking sense] condemned 
to repeat the past, releasing previously reinforced actions when circumstances dictate” 
(Clark 2016, p. 254). Such creatures would be behaviorally dumb devices – 
mechanisms that behave only in accord with blind habit.  
By contrast, the cognitively well-equipped creatures make use of models to act on 
the world intelligently, because having a model is thought to be what enables them “to 
evaluate potential actions using (as the name suggests) some kind of inner surrogate of 
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the external arena … [thus they are] able to ‘navigate into the future’” (Clark 2016, p. 
254). 
It is wildly implausible that any living system could be as simple and stupid as the 
model-free picture portrays the creatures at what is sometimes deemed to be the 
bottom rung of animal life. For example, new findings have shown that even bacteria 
are remarkably sophisticated in the ways in which they adapt, attune and respond to 
their environments (Losick and Desplan 2008, Tagkopoulos et al. 2008, Perkins and 
Swain 2009, Balázsi et al. 2011, Locke 2013). Thus, in an effort to make best sense of 
these findings, Fulda (2017) reports that, “the responsiveness of even the simplest 
living systems is remarkably flexible … microbiologists take this responsiveness to be 
evidence of cognition. After all, it is too supplely adaptive for a machine. Bacteria can 
respond appropriately to novel conditions, that is, conditions that have no evolutionary 
or developmental counterpart” (p. 77).  
What should we make of this? One natural answer is to deny that there is any 
model-free behaving. According to that answer, all behavior is model-driven. On such 
a view, it’s models all the way down; models of some kind must drive even the most 
basic forms of cognition. Any differences in organismic responsiveness would, thus, 
just a matter of degree of the sophistication of model used or how well it is used as 
opposed to the responsiveness in question being model-driven as opposed to model-
free. It seems that this is the sort of answer that Clark (2016) favors: he readily admits 
that the standard story is “almost certainly over-simplistic” (p. 253). For, despite 
acknowledging the intuitive pull of the model-based/model-free distinction, he admits 
that that distinction resonates “with old (but increasingly discredited) dichotomies 
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between habit and reason, between emotion and analytic evaluation” (Clark 2016, p. 
253). 
The more fundamental question is why posit any models as the drivers of behavior 
at all. Some do so because they are persuaded by the following line of argument: 
“There is a gap between the mind and the world, and (as far as anybody knows) you 
need to posit internal representations if you are to have a hope of getting across it. 
Mind the gap. You’ll regret it if you don’t” (Fodor 2009, p. 15).  
Of course, this can’t be Clark’s reason. The idea that inner models are needed to 
explain behaviour has long be challenged by the 4E-movement – embodied, enactive, 
ecological, extended – in cognitive science that Clark and company embrace. Those 
attracted to such views are thus happy to propound the roboticist’s slogan, that, “The 
world is its own best [model]/representation” (Clark 1997, p. 46; see also Brooks 
1991). Yet, against this idea, it has been plausibly argued that “the world can’t be its 
own best [model]/representation because the world doesn’t [model]/represent 
anything; least of all itself” (Fodor 2009, p. 15). 
In light of this, for those attracted to the 4E-approaches it seems, at least at first 
blush, that a better answer would be to hold that an “agent does not have a model of 
its world – it is a model” (Friston 2013, p. 213). This obviates having to address the 
awkward question of how the world, itself, can be a model. But, what exactly might it 
mean to say the system or agent itself is a model?  Friston et al. (2012, p. 6) advise 
that, “We must here understand ‘model’ in the most inclusive sense, as combining 
interpretive dispositions, morphology, and neural architecture, and as implying a 
highly tuned ‘fit’ between the active, embodied organism and the embedded 
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environment.” Following through on this logic, we are told that “in essence, 
[biological/cognitive systems] become models of causal structure in their local 
environment, enabling them to predict what will happen next and counter surprising 
violations of those predictions” (Friston 2012, p. 2101). 
 This looks like progress. Yet, if we understand models à la Friston’s proposal we 
face the question of how the system itself can both be a model and, simultaneously, 
use a model to drive its behavior. Is the claim that systems are models descriptive or 
explanatory? 
In this context, it is useful to consider Clark’s (2016) discussion of Sokolov’s work 
on habituation and what drives the thought that models are required to explain even 
very similar forms of psychological behavior and responsiveness. He writes: 
 
One might have thought of [habituation] as some kind of brute physical effect due 
to some kind of low-level sensory adaption. Sokolov noticed, however, that even a 
reduction in the magnitude of some habituated stimulus could engage 
‘dishabituation’ and prompted a renewed response. Sokolov concluded that the 
nervous system must learn and deploy a ‘neuronal model’” (Clark 2016, p. 89, 
emphases added). 
 
Admittedly, we observe that the system, as a whole, exhibits flexible behavior and 
is capable of learning. That is a true description of its cognitive capacities. But why 
must it learn a model; how does that explain this flexibility? Does the brain or nervous 
system learn and deploy a neural model or does the system –as a whole– through its 
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sustained history of worldly engagements – simply become capable of adapted, 
flexible, and selective responses? 
In any case, what might it mean to say that an organism or system learns and 
deploys a model? Clark (2016) everywhere advances the idea that cognizers acquire 
knowledge that can be appealed to in order to causally explain their subsequent 
behavior. Clark (2016) talks of model-driven systems in the following terms: as 
“using stored knowledge” (p. 6); as “knowledgeable consumers” (p. 6); as acquiring 
“bodies of knowledge” (p. 68); as something that “learns and deploys a generative 
model” (p. 22); as building up “the sensory scene using knowledge” (p. 25, p. 17); as 
“the brain using stored knowledge to predict” (p. 27); of successful perception 
requiring “the brain to use stored knowledge and expectations” (p. 79); and so on, and 
on. 
To take such talk seriously as part of an explanation we are owed the details of 
precisely what changes in the system occur when it acquires a model – when it learns 
a model– and how such structural changes amount to the acquisition of knowledge 
that can causally explain and drive the relevant responding. There is reason to doubt 
that this can be achieved (Hutto and Myin 2017, p. 26-53). Yet without a substantive 
proposal about how acquired knowledge can causally explain behavior, talk of the 
system’s learning and using models provides no explanation, only the illusion of one.  
Here it is useful to compare our compelling need to think that we must explain 
behavior by reference to systems being guided by neural models with Wittgenstein’s 
(1953, 1983) famous observations about our compelling need to explain rule-
following behavior with reference to being guided by our grasp of rules. 
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In the latter case, the grasped rule was meant to be distinct from and to stand, over 
and above, any actual attempts to apply it. For it seems that if we are to explain our 
capacity to follow a rule then there must be something – some fact – which determines 
which rule we are trying to follow and hence which standard we are answerable 
to. Wittgenstein thinks not; although he recognizes how deep the compulsion to think 
otherwise can run and its confounding effects on what we imagine is possible and 
needed to explain such phenomena.   
 
‘How can one follow a rule?’ That is what I should like to ask. But how does it 
come about that I want to ask that, when after all I find no kind of difficulty in 
following a rule? Here we obviously misunderstand the facts that lie before our 
eyes (RFM VI §38). 
 
But is that all? Isn’t there a deeper explanation; or mustn’t at least the 
understanding of the explanation be deeper? – Well have I myself a deeper 
understanding? Have I got more to give in the explanation? (PI §209) 
 
 We follow rules, obey orders and the like. We can describe the circumstances 
under which we learn to do so, but we cannot give a deeper –philosophically 
illuminating– explanation of what makes this possible in the terms of grasping the 
content of the rules in question. 
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Rather, we are reminded that, “Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. 
We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way” (PI §206). As Wright 
(2008) expounds: 
 
To say that in basic cases, we follow rules without reason is to say that our moves 
are uninformed by—are not the rational output of—any appreciation of facts about 
what the rules require. This is, emphatically, not the claim that it is inappropriate 
ever to describe someone as, say, knowing the rule(s) for [say] the use of ‘red’, or 
as knowing what such a rule requires. Rather it is a caution about how to 
understand such descriptions—or better: how not to understand them … In basic 
cases there is no such underlying rationalizing knowledge enabling the competence 
(p. 140, emphasis added). 
 
The moral Wright (2008) derives from this is that in basic cases of rule-following, 
“The knowledge is the competence” (p. 140). 
In this case, we are brought to see something that is already there before our eyes 
but which is blocked from sight by our attachment to misguided ways of framing the 
issues. This attachment is philosophical, not scientific in character, and it fuels 
misplaced explanatory urges of a ‘musty’ variety that have no place in the sciences of 
the mind. 
A similar analysis can be given to claims that we ‘must’ learn and deploy models if 
we are to explain flexible behaviors on the grounds that only then will we be able to 
explain how it is the case that such behaviors can be intelligent and flexible.  
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We can avoid this demand by speaking of an organism’s or system’s embodied 
know-how or competence, rather than assuming that it must be learning models or 
using bodies of knowledge. This would be to understand cognition as as kind of acting 
and interacting. That is what lies at at heart of a radical as opposed to a conservative 
enactivism (Hutto 2005). For in explaining flexible behavior the former makes no 
appeals to the idea of stored, mediating knowledge.  
 
4. Culture Permeates Cognition: A Radically Enactive Account 
 
Because enactivists start with different assumptions than cognitivists about the nature 
of cognition and how to explain adaptive responsiveness, they propose quite a 
different way of thinking about how culture connects with and influences cognition. 
The human brain not only evolved along with the human body, and works the way it 
does because of that; it’s also not isolated, but rather dynamically coupled to a body 
that is in turn dynamically coupled to an environment. The organism operates on the 
situation itself rather than on a model of the situation inferred by the brain. The 
complex interactions and transactions of brains, bodies and environments are 
structured by the physical aspects of neuronal processes, bodily movements, affects, 
anatomy and function, and environmental regularities. 
We can think of these interactions and transactions as forms of ongoing dynamical 
adjustments in which the brain, as part of and along with the larger organism, settles 
into various kinds of attunement with the environment – attuning to physical, social 
and cultural factors (Gallagher et al. 2013; Gallagher 2017). Neural accommodation 
occurs in this larger system. Notions of adjustment and attunement can be cashed out 
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in terms of physical states, or more precisely, physical dynamical processes that 
involve brain and body, autonomic and peripheral nervous systems, as well as 
affective and motoric changes.  
Many accounts of perception restrict the analysis to questions of recognition. As 
we’ve seen, the question is often about how the visual system recognizes what is out 
there in the world given that its access is limited to sensory input. This leads to the 
idea that the pure function of perception is to solve a puzzle, and what better way to 
solve a puzzle than to use inferential logic. But perception’s function is never purely 
recognitional; seeing, for example, involves more than recognition and motor control. 
The senses are not charged with just identifying or recognizing objects or guiding 
bodily movement in the world. A full-bodied response always involves more than 
that; there are always ulterior motives in the system. Because the organism desires 
food or rest or sex or aesthetic enjoyment or understanding, etc. the eye is never 
innocent.  
We saw how enculturation made a difference to the way the brains of Greek and 
English speakers respond in early visual processing to different shades of blue, 
revealing that neuronal activity in the earliest of perceptual processing areas, such as 
V1, is more than simple feature detection. V1 neurons anticipate reward if they have 
been attuned by prior experience (Shuler and Bear 2006). This is not a matter of 
receiving sensory data first, followed by inferential processes that then calculate 
reward possibility. Rather, it’s an intrinsically reward-oriented response or attunement 
to stimuli due to prior experiences and plastic changes. Indeed, there’s no room for or 
need for inferences in this respect. In the same way that, already attuned by prior 
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experience and enculturation, the visual cortexes of Greek and English speakers differ 
in how they respond to different shades of blue, V1 is already attuned to reward 
possibilities. 
Furthermore, in synchrony with central perceptual processes, autonomic and 
peripheral nervous systems are activated generating dynamical patterns that makes it 
unclear what is regulating what. Specifically, along with the earliest perceptual 
processing, the medial orbital frontal cortex is activated initiating a train of muscular 
and hormonal changes throughout the body, modulating processes in organs, muscles, 
and joints associated with prior experience (Barrett and Bar 2009). Sensory responses 
are coordinated with, modulate and guide affective and action responses and vice 
versa. Perceptual stimulation generates not just brain activation, but also specific 
bodily affective changes that are already integrated with sensorimotor processes tied 
to the current situation.  
  
5. Conclusion  
 
In sum, rather than wondering if cultural factors might contentfully penetrate or adjust 
cognition, we defend the idea that cultural factors color or permeate cognition. We 
have sketched and motivated a radical enactivist way of understanding how this 
occurs. Going the radical way requires turning one’s back on some familiar and 
deeply ingrained ways of thinking about how best to explain behavior. Thus, when 
Clark (2016) asks, “Why not simply ditch the talk of inner models and internal 
representations and stay on the true path of enactivist virtue?” (p. 291), we answer 
“Why not, indeed!”.  
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Like those who cannot see how to escape the rule-following paradox, cognitivists 
are hampered by the limits of their philosophical imaginations. Clark, for example, 
rhetorically asks: “Could we have told our story in entirely non-representationalist 
terms, without invoking the concept of a hierarchal probabilistic generative model at 
all?” (2016 p. 293). In reply he confesses that “as things stand, I simply do not see 
how this is to be achieved” (p. 293, emphases added).6 Luckily, for those whose sight 
is attuned to a different set of philosophical commitments, a more rewarding vision of 
cognitive science is a live possibility. 
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Notes 
 
                                                
1  Brogaard and Chomanski (2015) make this point clearly. They write “Consider 
the following example of a top-down influence on experience. Izzy is attending 
a difficult biochemistry lecture on migraines. Her thoughts about the difficult 
theories about the nature of migraines activate her amygdala, yielding a stress 
reaction. The activation in the amygdala causes her to develop migraine auras. 
Her thoughts about migraines thus resulted in an alteration of her visual 
experience, yet it cannot rightly be considered a case of cognitive penetration. 
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This is because the steps in the chain from the cognitive state to the alterations 
in her visual experience are not semantically coherent. There is no inferential 
relation between her thoughts about migraines and her stress reaction or 
between her stress reaction and her visual experience. So, even though her 
thoughts of migraines exert some top-down influence on her visual experience, 
this influence is not an instance of cognitive penetration” (p. 471). 
 
2  That early perception might be modular in the sense of being informationally 
encapsulated and isolated from the rest of cognition was first and most 
prominently advanced by Fodor (1983). According to the modularity thesis 
some cognitive systems are informationally encapsulated just in case they are 
only responsive to a select set of inputs, and insensitive to any other kind of 
information or content. In Fodor’s framework, modules are constrained by the 
information contained in the select set of inputs to which they are responsive 
and unaffected by whatever other information is available elsewhere in 
cognition. As such, if early perception is modular then it is precluded from 
communicating with a wider set of contentful attitudes – e.g. expectations, 
knowledge, and beliefs.  
 
3  Goldstone et al. ( 2001) report that “one of the largest sources of evidence that 
concepts influence perceptual descriptions comes from the field of categorical 
perception” (p. 28). For example, they cite work by Goldstone (1994) regarding  
the perception of dimensions of brightness and size which revealed that 
“experience with categorizing objects actually decreased people’s ability to spot 
subtle perceptual differences between the objects, if the objects belonged to the 
same category” (Goldstone et al. 2001, p. 29). 
 
4  A prime example of such sociocultural scaffolding would be acquiring our folk 
psychoclogical capacity to understand actions in terms of reasons through the 
mastery of certain kinds of narrative practice (Hutto 2008, Hutto and Kirchhoff 
2015).  
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5  Citing Heyes’s (2012) work on how reading and writing act as springboards for 
the creation of new cognitive capacities, Clark (2016) defends the idea that 
“many of our capacities for cultural learning are themselves cultural 
innovations, acquired by social interactions rather than flowing directly from 
fundamental biological adaptations” (p. 281). 
 
6   In this passage Clark (2016), like so many others, appears to be offering an 
inference from lack of imagination argument rather than an inference to the best 
explanation argument. For further details on the important but often overlooked 
difference between these two forms of argument see Hutto (2008) p. 94. 
  
  
 
